Regarding debates on the contribution of returnees to an emergent nation, findings in this multisited casestudy bring forward that ideas of return held by the three parties involved may force remigrants into transnationalism in both host and home countries. Findings also demonstrate that social capital may be seen as a resource or a restraint in the lives of returnees.
'Life is like a log, floating down the river'
Returning to Cambodia was really hard. I had to explain to my family here that I did not come back for the money, that I had come to find some kind of satisfaction. But this is where it had to happen… In my experience, your life is like a log floating down the river where the flood was taking place. You just go with the flow. You have to navigate by what you can see. You have to navigate a river by its bends (Interview with a Cambodian American returnee in Phnom Penh, October 2011).
The turbulence of civil war (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , the Khmer Rouge takeover (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) and the subsequent Vietnamese intervention (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) forced many Cambodians into exile. Among the nations that offered refuge, America and France stood out for the number of Cambodia refugees that were accepted for resettlement (Chan 2004 , Ong 2003 . Decades after these conflicts, overseas Cambodians from these host countries are resettling in Cambodia. The first generations of former refugees, especially, have combined the personal experiences of pre-conflict Cambodia and a prolonged stay in countries of exile with the process of 'getting reacquainted' with post-conflict Cambodia. A country suffering from widespread corruption and often characterized as a hybrid democracy and a fragile state (Becker 1998 , Un 2005 . (Cohen 1997) .
1 With Basch et al. this interdependence is expressed as a dynamic between three interacting ideas about return: firstly, the host country's notions on the returnees' ongoing incorporation into the country of resettlement, secondly, the home country's ideas on the returnees' belonging to their ancestral nation-state; and thirdly, the returnees' own ideas of a shared belonging and loyalty to both worlds (Basch et al. 1994 ).
In my experience as a management-and communication advisor to the Cambodian Ministry of Environment in Phnom Penh questions on returnees'
contributions to transformative change are relevant to the economic, political and social development of Cambodia. However, these issues have not received the attention they deserve. While educated members of the first generation of refugees have arrived back in Cambodia bringing an enormous potential for change through their knowledge, finances and social networks, I have also seen them depart again.
They often returned to their host countries as disillusioned people. Regarding returnees to Cambodia, a study of the limited amount of English and French literature on first generation Cambodian returnees confirms the observation that the French and American groups of Cambodian returnees have divergent attitudes towards Cambodia. While there is no merit in cultural stereotyping, previous studies do suggest that this group of returnees that was born in Cambodia, resettled abroad and later returned to Cambodia, has distinct reactions to the Cambodian political and social system (Heder 1995 , De Zeeuw 2009 . The Cambodian Americans are observed to mainly enter the Non-Governmental (NGO) sector and change the institutions of the country as relative 'outsiders', the Cambodian French, in contrast, often seem to enter government and work within traditional structures (Chan 2004 , Le Gal 2010 , Poethig 1997 . This puzzling situation is generalized here, in order to provide a clear picture of the issue under study.
This study aims to contribute to debates on transnationalism by inquiring into the social capital created and employed in transnational social networks by returnees.
Contrasting hypotheses on the nature of transnationalism relating to returnees' contributions to their homeland are explored.
In recent years, transnational relations have increasingly come under scrutiny.
Transnationalism as a concept proposes the idea of a flow of people, information and goods that connects citizens across the world and is a part of the dynamics of globalization (Glick Schiller et al. 1992) . As has been argued by Al-Ali and Koser, the idea of transnationalism and transnational social fields bringing people together, has removed the relevance of motivations for migratory movements as such. It has redirected attention to the transnational activities that take place after (forced) migration, instead of a continued focus on host or home country activities (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 4).
2
There is broad agreement among researchers in the field that transnational behavior takes place both in and through social networks (see, for instance: Landolt 2001, Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) . This study assumes that these networks are produced by the attachments formed in transnational social fields and may be interpreted as migrants' means of providing security across borders. As Glick
Schiller et al. observe, these migrants 'continuously translate the economic and social position gained in one political setting into political, social and economic capital in another' (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: 12) .
In order to describe the way transnational connections may be used as a resource for the returnees' activities, the concept of social capital is used. An evaluation of the current literature shows that social relations and the social capital they create have mostly been treated as a positive force. However, it is proposed here these can be structures of both constraint and opportunity that are negotiated and reinforced in the dynamics of interacting individuals (Kilduff and Tsai 2003) . For this study, social capital will be defined as: 'The ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures' (Portes 1998:6) .
The research was designed as a comparative multiple case-study, whilst acknowledging individual differences and social contexts. The major aims of comparative research are to identify similarities and differences between social entities enabling theories to be formed and tested. Placing immigrant communities in these localities side by side in order to analyze their convergences and contrasts provided a number of insights that will be presented in the Conclusions of this article. However, this research was not meant to bring forward a set of structural cultural and ideological differences between host countries. Moreover, the social capital created and employed in social networks in and between host and home countries was not systematically analyzed with quantitative methods. Rather, evaluations were made through informants' stories on the social networks' cohesion by analysis of their 'narrativizations' on conflict and solidarity. In contrast to personal narratives such as life stories, a narrativization focuses on particular 'selected' experiences considered pivotal by the narrator in semi structured interviews (Atkinson 1998 , Kohler Riessman 1993 .
The comparative approach was adopted to explore the use of transnational social networks as resources by evaluating the ability of 'actors with sufficient resources to realize their interest ' (DiMaggio 1988: 14) against the distinct backgrounds of exile, resettlement and return. Because of the comparative approach, the multisitedness resulted in a form of juxtaposition of that conventionally would be 'worlds apart' (Marcus 1995: 100-102 The key informants around which cases were built, varied in their affiliation with governmental and NGO sectors and the degree of change they envisioned. These two sectors were chosen to limit the research population to informants focusing on transformative change in Cambodia through the public sector. The informants selected from these sectors are assumed to aim at contributing to the 'public good'.
They were requested to inform this study based on their belonging to the first waves of overseas refugees, i.e. those who left Cambodia before 1980, with the unique quality of being eye-witnesses to, and participants in, the events dividing and reuniting Cambodia and Cambodians overseas. Excerpts from anonymized case studies built around key informants will guide the analysis in this article.
In the following, first, the design and methods of research are introduced.
Next, an outline of some key historical events is given as background to the findings and analyses presented in the main section. Transnational social networks in host and home countries are explored as well as the ways in which they may have served as resources for remigration. In the final section, the methodological and theoretical relevance as well as some practical implications are presented.
Methods
Data collection took place in Lyon, France (2010), Long Beach (CA), USA (2011) and Phnom Penh, Cambodia (2010 Cambodia ( & 2011 . The countrywide Cambodian population in France (2000) was estimated at 63,300 (Nann 2007: 148 Findings presented in this article are based on these data from different sources that, together, have been compiled into the individual case studies on key informants.
Data analysis consisted of, first, the broad analysis of interviews to determine main themes, and secondly, more detailed deductive and inductive coding of the interviews. Finally, in order to follow patterns that had been discovered in the process, fine coding and axial coding. This has brought forward the specific issues and experiences presented in this paper.
Background
In October 1991 the Paris Peace Accords were signed by all Cambodian factions. In
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) forces
arrived to assist the provisional government in the implementation of these Accords.
The aim of the UNTAC intervention was to ensure that democratic elections would take place. Cambodia was now a country 'in transition'. The international forces and the attention that accompanied the financial aid by the international community, were warmly welcomed as essential support needed to make a Cambodian 'renaissance'
happen (Becker 1998 , Kamm 1998 
Social capital in immigrant communities: Lyon & Long Beach
To explore social capital in transnational social networks from the perspective of divergent notions on return, pertinent characteristics of the Lyon and Long Beach
Cambodian communities are explored. Distinct host country ideas on 'integration' and the exiled communities' continued loyalty to their home countries are related to individual members' observations on return. This will illustrate some of the similarities as well as the differences between these overseas communities.
Lyon, France
Cambodian French returnee Madame Pas was born in 1966 into a wealthy family connected to the royal court. France. These first exiles could use their existing access to France to resettle there.
Often they were of middle-and higher-class background, more educated and more likely to be male than the refugees that followed from 1979 onward. Moreover, they could build on an existing Cambodian French community supporting their process of social adaptation. Their reception was warm and a sense of solidarity was extended to them from French society (Ebihara et al. 1994 , Meslin 2006 . Members of the community observe that the educated of the first generation and those who cannot find an adequate source of income in the United States, are especially motivated to go back. However, the majority of remaining informants have either been on visits or described to me their 'failed' return and the shame of another remigration back to the US. Ms Kat, a local social worker, comments:
Many of the community's members did go back. 60-80 per cent did go back to visit family. But I don't know anybody who went back for the long term. I did not see any successful. They come back broke and with a broken family but also with no money (Interview Long Beach, April 2011).
In contrast to the Cambodians in Lyon, the first groups of Cambodian migrants and (later) refugees entering Long Beach could not join an existing community. They were welcomed by a small group of engineering and agricultural exchange students and military 'trapped' in America as relations with Cambodia deteriorated (Clymer 2007) . In later waves of refugees, for the many of the so-called 'lost cases'(without family), there was no choice between resettlement countries as they did not have the connections, status or education to be accepted in France and there were few other host countries available (Chan 2003 , Ong 2003 . Ms Nor, a Cambodian French member of the Long Beach community explains:
The US felt a big responsibility to relocate the refugees. America first allowed other countries to screen the refugees and admit them. France only accepted educated people. Very few people of an ordinary background were allowed there (Interview Phnom Penh, September 2011).
When it comes to the United States in those years, the infrastructure and approach to refugee resettlement was very different from France. Policies and provisions were focused on ethnic cohesion instead of complete integration into mainstream society. US governmental researchers summarize the essence of this notion as:
It is only within a refugee's own ethnic community that this kind of crosscultural understanding and lasting long-range support can lead to successful social adjustment through meaningful, relevant and cost-effective services (Khoa and Bui 1985: 223-9) These resettlement policies focus on cohesive, strong immigrant communities representing the 'ethnic' interest. Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, the sense of solidarity that was thus enforced, put pressure on existing social networks. 
Conflict and Solidarity
People here are concerned about their own families and their own affairs and not about the community. The Cambodians do not want to be noticed and they do not make controversial statements ( homeland politics, and a history of conflict due to the distinct backgrounds of refugees coming to the United States are most often blamed for these divisions.
As described by a majority of the Cambodian American informants from Long Beach, this conflict extends to a certain animosity and cultural competition that is felt between the host and home countries. For instance, the establishment of Cambodia Town in Long Beach is often perceived of as an achievement unique to the overseas Cambodians in defiance of criticism from the homeland. General
Khieng, a veteran from the army explains:
When we fight hard to get Cambodia Town, we are here and not there [Cambodia] . It's not for someone from Cambodia. It's like if we build a house and somebody from nowhere comes to live in it. It's like we give all the credit to those people! (Interview Long Beach, March 2011)
The Cambodian community in Long Beach may be characterized as one of conflict extending even to transnational relations. This is in contrast to the nature of the Cambodian community in Lyon, which, in the members' perceptions, could be summarized as one of solidarity and relatively low expectations. In terms of this research, the clash of different ideas on return seems almost non-existent in Lyon, allowing for employment of the benefits of social capital. Clashes on ideas related to host and home country issues are very evident in Long Beach, creating tensions between factions. The social capital available in social networks is then sometimes a constraint and sometimes a facilitator to the community members' emancipation.
Social capital upon return: Phnom Penh
This section presents findings on the Cambodian French and Cambodian American returnees' activities. These findings are based on both archival research and recent interviews. Next, distinctions in the employment of their transnational social networks and the relations between (re)migrant communities are discussed.
Returnees in governmental and NGO sectors
Madame Pas explained to me that it made sense for the Cambodian French returnees to enter government in the UNTAC years, as it was very hard to find French- positions were nuanced by the observation that advisory positions may be awarded to returnees in a need to find a 'legitimation of policy' and did not necessarily involve having 'a voice' in decision making (see also : Um 2006a ). This could demonstrate how it is hard to make a contribution and how many returnees got stuck or sidetracked in their ambitions. Mr. Hui, a Cambodian American politician explains:
It's not specifically about the returnees, it's really about power and money. In reality it's about control and not about development. Things have changed now since the beginning, when it was very much about safety. Now if you touch the money or the power then you get into trouble. As long as you don't touch the power or the money you will be fine (Interview Phnom Penh, October 2011). Informants interviewed in Cambodia express that, over the last decades, the relatively cautious reception of Cambodian American returnees has evolved into a warm welcome to people from a country that is perceived to be rich and powerful.
Analysis of the interviews demonstrates that
Mrs Lea, a Cambodian American activist that worked for the UN in the 1990s, observes:
In Cambodia, before, most people were brought up in French culture and they still think of social status like that. The US cannot come close to it in tradition. But now people think that speaking English is more international (Interview Phnom Penh, October 2011). We have a few friends who came out to do business and they lost. Maybe their networks weren't very good. They might have gotten themselves into trouble they were not aware of. They ended up in trouble and they got cheated (Interview Phnom Penh, September 2011)
Remigrant Communities: Conflict and Solidarity
In general, 'Cambodian Cambodians', Cambodian French and Cambodian Americans all seem to have fixed ideas on the cultural assets that returnees bring.
Although there is little solidarity between groups of returnees within Cambodia (informants make few references to a 'remigrant community'), these remigrants are often grouped and treated as 'foreigners' by the local community. Informants explain the ways in which individual returnees are divided into 'remigrant groups' according to their sending countries. These groups, moreover, are 'ranked' according to perceptions of the image, wealth and influence of these former host countries. While this cultural exclusion does affect their reception, the Cambodian remigrants themselves do not identify with the remigrant divisions imposed on them.
Illustrative of this stereotyping that affects the character of returnees' reception is Cambodian French Dr. Kim's comment on Cambodian American returnees:
The Cambodian Americans stand out as they are these really flamboyant personalities, especially the people from Long Beach as they were always very politically active and it was kind of expected that they would come here after the elections (Interview Phnom Penh, September 2011).
Next to this 'flamboyance' and 'having a lot of money' the Cambodian Americans for -at least-an hour. Key informants were interviewed several times and for several hours. 4 When it comes to the current political culture in Cambodia, Ayres (1999) argues that this is an environment that is still dominated by a (neo)traditional system of governance and administration based on the culturally entrenched notions of hierarchy and power found in patron-client relations. Building on the relations surrounding the Cambodian royal court in the past, and inspired on Indian and
Chinese aristocratic ordering, this system of 'patronage' or ' clientelism' is characterized by the centralized powers of government that allows access to resources conditioned on subordination, compliance or dependence on the goodwill of patrons (Roniger 2004: 353 
